The EU’s 18th Package of Sanctions against Russia

On 18th July 2025, the Council of the European Union (EU) announced the 18th package of sanctions against Russia. This aimed to weaken and mitigate Russia’s capabilities in various fields, including energy, financing, trade, and military. The following sanctions are specific to energy:

Listing 105 more vessels from Russia’s shadow fleet. Once listed, these ships cannot access EU ports or receive services there.
Transaction ban for Nord 1 and Nord 2 streams, which are natural gas pipelines from Russia to Germany.
Lowering the price cap for Russian crude oil from $60 to $47.60 (USD).
Ban of imports of energy products which are refined from Russian crude.

The impact of the first two measures is difficult to quantify. The effectiveness of shadow fleet listing because it is dependent on enforcement. Additionally, the Nord stream bans have no practical effect since both have not been used since 2022. In contrast, the price cap and sanction of refined products are more amenable to analysis, and this article will therefore focus on their expected impact on Russian energy revenue and the wider oil market.

Lowering of the Price Cap on Russian Crude

The price cap was lowered from $60 to $47.60 on 3rd September 2025. The cap is automatically set to be 15% the average market price of Russian crude, and will be dynamically adjusted every six months. It is clear that the intention of this is to reduce Russia’s crude revenue.

Prior to the price cap, Urals was trading above the cap at about $55, so it has to be traded at discount to be compliant with the price cap. Prior to the initial price cap implementation of $60 on 5th December 2022, Urals was also above the price cap at about $66, and over December 2022 it fell by approximately $13 to $53. One might expect the lowering of the price cap to have a similar effect, because in both cases, Urals was trading about $6-7 above the price cap before implementation. However, the context is very different between 2022 and today.

Urals NWE swaps

One of the biggest differences is that in 2022, the price cap was implemented at the same time as an EU embargo on Russian crude. Due to the embargo, Russian crude shifted from Europe to China and India – more accurately, these shifts have been happening since March 2022 due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine causing elevated supply risks in Europe. Notably, the increase in imports for India was drastic. Before 2022, India imported little to no crude from Russia, but became one of the biggest importers alongside China by the time the year ended. The embargo and price cap only served to formally close the European market to Russian crude. This year, there is no parallel sanction being implemented with the price cap, and countries are already not trading with Russia, so there is no expectation that there will be a change in the trade flows of Russian crude.

China/India Crude Imports from Russia

Source: Trademap, International Trade Centre

Even though the sanctions were not the main reasons for trade flows shifting, they did cause significant shifts in the market. In the month they were implemented, Brent fell by ~$5, Urals fell by ~$13, meaning that the Brent/Urals spread widened by ~$8.

Urals NWE Swaps and Brent Swaps

Even countries that don’t comply with the price cap paid less for Russian crude – India paid $6 less on average per barrel of crude in January 2023, the month following the price cap implementation in 2022. China similarly paid less too, and considering that these countries combined take in 85-90% of Russian crude exports, this represents a significant drop in crude revenue for Russia.

Average Monthly Price of Imported Russian Crude in India

Source: United Nations Comtrade Database

Some of these may apply to 2025, but again, the contexts are different. For one, 2022 was a year of crude supply tightening, with OPEC+ cutting crude production in multiple months. The biggest cut of 2 Mb/d happened in October 2022, just two months before the price cap. This made the price cap hurt Russia more in the face of a market with less crude supply. On the other hand, this year OPEC+ is doing the reverse and increasing oil production by 547 kb/d, which makes the price cap less painful for Russia.

Considering all these factors, it seems that the price cap will be much less impactful this year as opposed to 2022. Trade flows are not expected to shift further, there are no parallel sanctions being implemented, and crude supply is less tight based on OPEC+’s outlook. With all that being said, because Urals is priced above the new price cap, there is some expectation that Urals will weaken and the Brent/Urals spread will widen, similar to 2022. However, the magnitude of these price movements are expected to be much smaller.

The Ban on Imports Refined with Russian Crude

The ban on imports refined what Russian crude will be implemented on 21st January 2026. In 2025, India and China remain the largest importers of Russian crude, taking in 85% of Russian crude exports, and will therefore be the countries most affected by this ban. However, in 2025 so far, China makes up less than 1% of Europe’s refined product imports, so this ban does not affect them much. India accounts for 7.8% of Europe’s refined product imports, largely diesel, and constitutes over 11% of Europe’s diesel imports.

Europe's Refined Products and Diesel Imports

Source: Trademap, International Trade Centre

About 30-40% of India’s crude is imported from Russia, so any diesel produced from that will be sanctioned after January. This is creating anticipation that the West will have less diesel supply, which is already being reflected in prices. Gasoil E/W Q1 has fallen by about $7 following the announcement of the sanctions to about -$27, when it was typically within the range of -$10 to -$20.

Gasoil EW 10ppm Q1 Sanctions

When such volatility exists in the market, it may present as trading opportunities via mean reversion as seen in 2022 with the Russo-Ukrainian war. The fear of diesel supply tightness has to be rebalanced by arbitrage flows, and as Indian cargoes find new markets and Europe sources for new diesel suppliers, the expectation is that prices pull back as well.

Will India and China Wean Off Russian Crude?

There is some expectation that the ban will disincentivize India from continuing to consume Russian crude, therefore affecting Russian crude revenue. However, taking a closer look at India’s numbers, they consume more than 70% of the diesel that they produce, which is unaffected by the ban. The ban also only comes into effect in January 2026, giving India time to look for other buys in the East for their soon-to-be sanctioned diesel. Therefore, while there likely will be some reduction in Indian use of Russian crude, it is expected to be limited. This, in tandem with China being mostly unaffected by this ban, translate to it being unlikely to effectively reduce Russian crude use.

India Diesel Production/ Consumption

Source: Petroleum Planning and Analysis Cell, India

Overall, the price cap is expected to cause Russian crude prices, and therefore crude revenue, to decline. The import ban on refined products is likely to have a limited impact in reducing Russian crude consumption. However, it has caused worries of diesel supply tightness in the West, evidenced by Gasoil E/W Q1 prices falling. Considering the geopolitical volatility of 2025 so far, the future of Russian sanctions and the broader oil market remains uncertain. In the event of any future developments, it will be crucial to carefully analyze them and swiftly adapt to shifts in the market.

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China’s Slowdown and Discounted Crude Advantage in Asia

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